Brazil will need fiscal adjustment after 2026, Goldman Sachs says

“The essence of populism is this short-term sense of well-being achieved through mechanisms that are unsustainable over time. The bill comes later,” said Alberto Ramos, head of Latin America economic research at Goldman Sachs. “What worries me is that after the election, whoever wins will need to push for a fiscal adjustment when the population doesn’t feel there’s a problem. Growth has been good, unemployment low, wages rising. I don’t think people will buy into the idea that we need a deep fiscal adjustment.”

Mr. Ramos contrasted Brazil’s situation with Argentina’s, where President Javier Milei won office on a platform of tough reforms at a time when the economy was already in deep trouble, facing contraction, soaring inflation, and rapid impoverishment.

“He pushed through a fiscal adjustment equivalent to 6 percentage points of GDP in an economy that also had very rigid spending, and was already suffering significantly. But it was clear to most of the population that the Kirchnerist model had failed—economically, socially, and politically,” Mr. Ramos said.

He believes part of the recent improvement in Brazilian asset prices stems from investor expectations that a new administration will take office in 2027, and bring with it a shift in economic policy.

“No matter who wins, a fiscal adjustment will be inevitable, and it won’t be easy,” he said. “If President Lula is reelected, fiscal realities will impose tighter constraints, otherwise, things won’t end well. A more conservative candidate would probably be more inclined to implement that adjustment. But my question is: Is Brazil ready?,” Mr. Ramos asked, adding that he’s not fully convinced about a scenario in which the current opposition wins either.

Mr. Ramos said the necessary overhaul would include loosening the rigid structure of public spending: changing laws that tie budget allocations to health and education, revising the rule that mandates real increases to the minimum wage, and reviewing other legislation that hardwires spending.

“We already know the path to take, if there’s political will,” he said.

Political balance

One hurdle, however, is that “Congress is not exactly the guardian of fiscal orthodoxy,” Mr. Ramos added. “The real fight between Congress and the government is just about who gets credit for the spending. The political balance may not be one that allows these reforms—some of which are constitutional—to pass. In Argentina, the crisis helped get them through. That’s not our situation, thankfully, but if we keep delaying, we may hit a breaking point that forces a much more painful and destabilizing adjustment.”

Brazil’s fiscal issues aren’t new, but have worsened recently, leaving policymakers with less room to maneuver, he said. One example: the government has already raised taxes without improving fiscal fundamentals.

“A fiscal adjustment that relies on tax hikes is already a poor-quality fix, but even so, how would society react, after four years of rising taxes?” Mr. Ramos asked. “We’ve used up our ammo without defeating the enemy. We raised taxes to spend more, not to improve the primary balance.”

Adjusting for the economic cycle, Brazil’s fiscal picture is worse than the headline numbers suggest, he said.

“When the economy was booming, the government doubled down and injected even more liquidity, overheating the system. The best time to make adjustments is when the economy is doing well. Now, it’s slowing, and they want to reverse the fiscal impulse. They should’ve held back earlier, taken advantage of the revenue from growth to build a better primary result.”

Mr. Ramos said Brazil’s economy is now slowing because it has hit “capacity constraints.” He believes the recent GDP growth of 3% or more is above the country’s potential. On top of that, monetary policy remains tight.

“But if someone arrived from another planet and saw Brazil with 15% nominal interest rates and 10% real rates, they’d assume the country is in deep recession. And it’s not—it’s just slowing, because there are credit policies, quasi-fiscal programs. The effectiveness of monetary policy has been undermined by fiscal activism,” he said.

Letting the economy slow is necessary to bring down inflation and eventually lower both inflation and interest rates, Mr. Ramos added.

“If no action is taken, that’s the path we’re on—and it’s not one we should resist, because we’re not facing an economic collapse.”

He said he doesn’t expect a “fiscal disaster in 2026,” despite it being an election year. “But we should be running a surplus,” he said. “This government’s view, which I don’t share, that the economy only grows through fiscal stimulus, paired with an upcoming election, means that the current slowdown is probably not deep enough to allow monetary policy to shift to a neutral stance.”

Even if there is room for the Central Bank to begin cutting rates in December, he said, interest rates will likely remain tight through the end of 2026.

Mr. Ramos acknowledged some improvement in headline inflation but noted that service inflation “is still far from good.” Currency appreciation and lower prices for commodities and food have helped, he said, but given those factors, “Inflation should be around 2%.”

“That’s not the case. The target is 3%, and we’ve been above it for many years. The Central Bank’s projections don’t even place 3% within the relevant forecast horizon. It’s a tough battle that requires a completely different fiscal approach from what we’ve seen over the past four years.”