10/31/2025 

The Minas Gerais Development Company (Codemig) and the Brazilian Metallurgy and Mining Company (CBMM), controlled by the Moreira Salles family, have signed a new agreement ensuring the continued extraction of niobium from the Araxá mines in Minas Gerais for another 30 years, with the possibility of a 15-year extension—keeping operations running until 2070.

The new contract replaces the previous one, which was due to expire in 2032, and increases Codemig’s share in CBMM’s profits to include 25% of the earnings from the sale of materials other than niobium, such as rare-earth elements, without requiring any additional investment from the state-owned company.

Luísa Barreto, CEO of both Codemge and Codemig, told Valor the decision to renew the partnership ahead of schedule followed economic analyses that showed it was the best option to boost revenue and enhance the company’s value, at a time when the state government is debating the federalization of its assets.

“This partnership brings the greatest value to Codemig. Beyond extending the collaboration, we secured better terms that generate more returns for both the company and the state of Minas Gerais, including participation in CBMM’s future investments,” Ms. Barreto said.

Updated market valuations for Codemig are expected to be released in the coming weeks, as they will now include potential revenue from other minerals. According to Ms. Barreto, the new structure also strengthens oversight mechanisms and ensures greater predictability for public finances and legal certainty, securing dividend payments for decades.

Among the alternatives evaluated by the state-owned company were launching a new bidding process, direct mining of niobium, or renewing the existing partnership with CBMM. The renewal was deemed the most viable option. “Other partners would hardly be able to achieve the same sales volume or market share we currently have,” she noted.

Codemig is compensated through a silent partnership (SCP), which grants the state-owned company 25% of CBMM’s net profit. In 2024, the partnership generated R$1.73 billion for the Minas Gerais-based company.

Since 1972, Codemig and CBMM have jointly operated neighboring mines in Araxá through the Companhia Mineradora do Pirocloro de Araxá (Comipa), in which Codemig holds 51% and CBMM 49%. Comipa extracts the ore and sells it exclusively to CBMM, which processes and markets the final product.

Current estimates indicate that Codemig’s mine will be depleted in the early 2060s, while CBMM’s deposits could last until 2070 if production continues at the current pace. Until the new deal, Codemig was entitled to 25% of profits only from niobium and was required to invest 25% in other projects to earn proportional returns, as with barite and magnetite.

“We had already participated in those investments, but we had to contribute 25% to be entitled to the profits. Now, when CBMM explores other minerals, including rare earths, which we know are present in our deposits, we will earn profits without any additional investment,” Ms. Barreto explained.

Rare-earth elements are not yet economically viable for extraction, but if conditions change, Codemig’s stake will already be guaranteed. The new contract also ensures Codemig 25% of profits from the potential sale of mining tailings until 2085, even after the partnership ends.

The extended term also resolves long-standing questions about the contractual balance between the two companies. Codemig’s mine contains a higher niobium grade, while CBMM’s has larger reserves and a longer lifespan—an issue that had raised concerns among regulatory bodies about the fairness of the arrangement. With the new timeframe, projections show that by the end of the contract, CBMM’s extracted volume will surpass Codemig’s, balancing the deal.

“Studies show that, considering the contract through 2070, the total volume of niobium extracted from CBMM’s mine will exceed that from Codemig’s, even after accounting for ore grade differences,” Ms. Barreto said.

This is the third major agreement Ms. Barreto has led on behalf of Minas Gerais. She was also responsible for renegotiating the Mariana and Brumadinho settlement agreements following catastrophic damn breaches around iron mines.

Today, the global ferroniobium market is estimated at fewer than 128,000 tonnes, still limited compared to other minerals critical to the energy transition, such as lithium, with CBMM maintaining global leadership.

The company strategically operates below full capacity, helping set the market’s space, but has been expanding into new markets for niobium, which remains primarily used in the steel industry.

*By Robson Rodrigues, Valor — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

10/31/2025

Vale is currently focusing on its own assets rather than pursuing mergers and acquisitions, said CEO Gustavo Pimenta on Tuesday (28). When asked about the possibility of a counteroffer related to the merger deal between Anglo American and Teck Resources, the executive stated that “is not on the company’s agenda.”

“Our main differentiator today is the development of our own ore bodies,” Mr. Pimenta told reporters after participating in Exposibram, a mining conference organized by the Brazilian Mining Institute (IBRAM) in Salvador, Bahia. “We have a mineral endowment, especially in Carajás, that allows us to grow organically through project development. That’s the company’s focus,” he said.

In September, Anglo American signed a merger agreement with Canada’s Teck Resources, which, if finalized, would form a copper mining powerhouse valued at roughly $50 billion. Anglo American, listed on the London Stock Exchange, will own 62.4% of the combined firm, while Teck shareholders will hold the rest.

When asked if Vale might consider acquiring another copper producer, Mr. Pimenta reiterated that the company is not pursuing mergers or acquisitions.

Even so, he did not rule out the possibility of doing business with Bahia Mineração (Bamin). “We are always monitoring all development projects in Brazil, especially iron ore,” he said. “We have other capital allocation priorities, but we’re always looking at opportunities.”

According to Reuters, shareholders of Bamin—part of the Eurasian Resources Group of Kazakhstan—are currently evaluating interest from three potential investors, said Eduardo Ledsham, the company’s CEO. The investors might acquire either a stake or full control of the iron ore producer, whose expansion plan would need about $6 billion in investments. Market expectations suggest that one investor will be chosen to proceed with negotiations, likely by early 2026.

Speaking at Exposibram, Mr. Pimenta said Vale expects to reclaim its position as the world’s largest iron ore producer this year, aiming to reach 360 million tonnes of annual output by the end of the decade. The company’s third-quarter production was already its highest since 2018. Vale lost the top spot to Anglo-Australian Rio Tinto shortly after the Brumadinho disaster in 2019, when a tailings dam at an iron mine collapsed, killing 270 people.

Mr. Pimenta reaffirmed Vale’s dedication to expanding its product lineup to meet customer needs and support global decarbonization efforts.

“We believe these cycles will remain constructive for the mining industry, especially for high-grade ores that are key to the energy transition,” he said.

According to the executive, Vale is well-positioned in the global effort to cut greenhouse gas emissions and highlighted the company’s green briquette, an innovation for lower-carbon steelmaking. “This decarbonization route favors high-quality ores,” he said. “We’re potential winners in the world’s decarbonization agenda.”

As Valor reported on October 1, when Mr. Pimenta marked one year as CEO, the company has been working to demonstrate to investors improvements in dam management and safety practices.

“Now that we no longer have any level-3 dams, we can attract more investors,” Mr. Pimenta said Tuesday. “The mining of the future means ending the use of tailings dams.”

The journalist’s travel was facilitated by an invitation from Nexa

*By Kariny Leal — Salvador

Source: Valor International

O valor do benefício terá 25% de acréscimo pelo fato de o segurado precisar de amparo de outras pessoas para atividades rotineiras 

 

 

 

30/10/2025

A Décima Turma do Tribunal Regional Federal da 3ª Região (TRF3) determinou ao Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) a concessão de aposentadoria por incapacidade permanente a um homem com diagnóstico de alienação mental decorrente de doença psiquiátrica.

Com base no voto do relator, desembargador federal Marcos Moreira, o colegiado reconheceu o direito do segurado ao auxílio por incapacidade temporária desde maio de 2018, quando foi feito o requerimento administrativo, e à conversão desse benefício em aposentadoria por incapacidade permanente a partir de setembro de 2023, quando foi realizada perícia judicial, observada eventual prescrição quinquenal.

Foi autorizado ainda o acréscimo de 25% no valor da aposentadoria, pelo fato de haver comprovada necessidade do amparo permanente de terceiros para os atos da vida diária.

O laudo da perícia judicial indicou psicose esquizofreniforme e fase inicial de processo de demência. A conclusão foi que a doença psiquiátrica começou aos 25 anos de idade e se agravou, com quadro psicótico desde maio de 2016. No momento da perícia, em 2018, ele tinha 57 anos.

O pedido havia sido negado no primeiro grau da Justiça Federal. A controvérsia girou em torno da existência ou não de período de carência. Em regra, é exigida a comprovação do pagamento de 12 contribuições mensais.

“O autor não precisa cumprir a carência para fazer jus ao benefício por incapacidade, porquanto seu quadro clínico decorre de alienação mental”, afirmou o desembargador federal Marcos Moreira, citando dispositivo da legislação previdenciária nesse sentido (art. 151 da Lei nº 8.213/91 e o art. 30, §2º, III, do Decreto nº 3.048/99).

O homem, que trabalhava como padeiro, contribuiu regularmente entre julho de 1989 e setembro de 1997, perdeu a qualidade de segurado, reingressou no Regime Geral da Previdência Social em fevereiro de 2007 e fez contribuições como facultativo, de forma descontínua, nos anos de 2007, 2010, 2011, 2016 e 2018.

O relator observou a existência de ação de interdição, que designou a irmã do segurado sua curadora definitiva a partir de julho de 2005. Com base nesse fato, concluiu que o intervalo de tempo em que não houve contribuição para a Previdência coincide com o período em que ele estava incapaz de reger seus próprios atos da vida civil.

Conforme o magistrado, a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) é pacífica no sentido de que deve ser preservada a condição de segurado na hipótese de impossibilidade de contribuir em decorrência de incapacidade laborativa.

A ação previdenciária transitou em julgado, tornando a decisão do TRF3 definitiva.

Fonte: Assessoria de Comunicação Social do TRF3

O lojista tem o direito de pedir ao shopping center a cada 60 dias a prestação de contas das despesas cobradas, sem que esse prazo represente a perda do direito, de acordo com o artigo 54, parágrafo 2º, da Lei 8.245/1991.

 

 

 

30 de outubro de 2025,

 

Freepik

Juízo considerou que posição da escada no Shopping violava o dever de segurança esperado em ambientes de circulação pública

Lojista de shopping tem prazo mínimo de 60 dias para pedir cada prestação de contas, sendo que não há decadência desse direito

 

Essa conclusão é da 4ª Turma do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, que negou provimento ao recurso especial de uma empresa administradora de um shopping center de Maringá (PR).

O caso trata de uma ação ajuizada por um lojista cujos pedidos não foram atendidos pela empresa de forma extrajudicial. As instâncias ordinárias deram razão ao autor da ação.

Ao STJ, a administradora sustentou que o prazo de 60 dias previsto no artigo 54, parágrafo 2º, da Lei 8.245/1991 diz respeito ao período que o lojista tem para solicitar a prestação de contas

Esse seria um prazo decadencial, portanto. A decadência é a perda de um direito quando seu titular não o exerce dentro de um período estabelecido.

Prazo para prestação de contas

Relatora do recurso especial, a ministra Isabel Gallotti rejeitou a alegação da administradora e confirmou a interpretação do Tribunal de Justiça do Paraná. Ela votou como a 3ª Turma do STJ vem se posicionando.

Em sua interpretação, a norma em questão estabelece apenas uma faculdade ao locatário: exigir a prestação de contas a cada 60 dias na via extrajudicial, o que não impede o ajuizamento da ação de exigir contas.

O intuito da lei é, considerando-se a complexidade das relações locatícias nos shoppings, evitar uma avalanche mensal de pedidos de prestação de contas.

“Assim, é possível concluir que a lei estabelece apenas lapso temporal mínimo a ser observado para que o pedido de prestação de contas possa ser formulado, e não um prazo decadencial que, se não exercido a tempo, impossibilitará o locatário de o requerer.”

Em voto-vista, o ministro Raul Araújo chegou à mesma conclusão. Eles foram acompanhados pelos ministros Antonio Carlos Ferreira, Marco Buzzi e João Otávio de Noronha.

REsp 2.045.634

 

 

 

10/28/2025

Brazil’s share of the global pulp market is expected to grow by 6%, reaching 34% by 2030, according to Rabobank. The increase will be driven by new mill capacity and a shift from softwood (pine) to hardwood (eucalyptus) pulp. Although China remains the leading buyer of Brazilian hardwood pulp, the rapid expansion of integrated pulp production in the country is likely to reduce import volumes in the coming years—creating an opportunity for the United States, currently the second-largest destination, to gain ground in Brazil’s export portfolio.

Traditionally, Chinese producers faced high costs and limited wood availability, which made them heavily dependent on imported market pulp. However, during the real estate crisis in 2021, surplus wood originally intended for construction was redirected toward integrated pulp production.

According to Rabobank, China’s integrated hardwood pulp capacity surged from 5,000 tonnes in 2016 to 9,500 tonnes in 2024. The bank projects that by 2027, production will reach 14,500 tonnes—a nearly 53% increase.

“Of the projects planned in the past three years, no one had anticipated this development,” says Andres Padilla, analyst at Rabobank. He notes that the market will likely adjust, with the most efficient producers filling the space left by less competitive ones. Even so, part of the displaced demand will need to find new markets—and the U.S. is emerging as a promising destination for Brazilian fiber.

In 2024, Brazil supplied 82% of U.S. short-fiber pulp imports, totaling 2 million tonnes, according to Rabobank’s report. This marks a 74% increase from a decade earlier and an average annual growth rate of 4.7%. The pulp is primarily used for tissue paper production, including toilet paper and facial tissues.

In the long-fiber segment, typically used for paper packaging, the U.S. market has long been dominated by Canada. However, post-pandemic shifts in global supply chains have opened room for Brazilian and European producers. In 2024, Brazil accounted for 10% of U.S. softwood pulp imports—around 300,000 tonnes—while Canada’s share fell to 75%, according to the bank.

“Brazil is well-positioned. In addition to managing exchange rate volatility more effectively, it benefits from low production costs and competitive logistics,” says Mr. Padilla.

This strength, he explains, is the result of several factors—including the short seven-year rotation cycle of eucalyptus, advances in genetic research that boosted productivity, and large-scale investments in integrated pulp mills.

Beyond Suzano’s Cerrado Project, companies such as Chile’s Arauco and CMPC, as well as Indonesia’s Bracell, are expanding operations in Brazil. There are also expectations for a second production line at the Eldorado mill in Três Lagoas, Mato Grosso do Sul. With these new capacities, Rabobank estimates that Brazil’s pulp exports will rise from 20 million tonnes today to 25 million tonnes by 2030.

Another factor supporting this growth, Mr. Padilla notes, is the price gap between hardwood and softwood pulp, known as the “spread.” Currently, hardwood pulp sells for about $250 to $300 less per tonne on the U.S. East Coast market, according to Rabobank.

“There’s a clear economic incentive for hardwood pulp to gain market share in the U.S.,” Mr. Padilla explains. “The spread is wide right now, and the supply and demand dynamics suggest it will be difficult to close that gap in the short to medium term.”

Beyond pricing, Brazil’s advantage lies in its long-standing commercial relationships with U.S. buyers and its reputation for reliability and quality. “Brazilian suppliers already have deep, consistent partnerships with U.S. clients, meeting their needs efficiently,” Mr. Padilla adds.

Against this backdrop, the White House’s decision to impose a 10% tariff on Brazilian pulp last year was, according to him, “a shot in the foot.” It is no coincidence, he says, that Washington quickly reversed course and eliminated the tariff.

*By Helena Benfica — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

 

10/28/2025 

If the Donald Trump administration’s approach to several other countries is any guide, a temporary suspension of existing punitive tariffs on Brazilian goods could be followed by a 90-day deadline to negotiate an agreement on reciprocal trade.

The “gesture of goodwill” requested by Brazil from President Trump is expected to be on the table in Washington next week, pending confirmation of the meeting. Brazil maintains that the 50% tariff penalty is unjustified, a position reiterated both during the meeting between presidents Lula and Trump and in the first working session between their teams the following day in the Malaysian capital.

Temporary tariff suspensions have been a common practice for Washington. That was the case with India, which received a 90-day window, until July 9, to negotiate after the U.S. imposed an additional 26% tariff. When patience with New Delhi ran out, the full 50% rate was enforced.

With China, the agreement reached in May granted a 90-day truce for most tariff hikes, cutting U.S. rates from very high levels to about 30% while talks continued. That truce was later extended to November 10. Mr. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to meet this week, when a deal will likely be finalized.

Similarly, with Mexico, on July 31 the U.S. postponed for about 90 days an additional tariff increase on Mexican imports to allow more time for broader trade discussions that remain ongoing. With Canada, Washington temporarily suspended a tariff hike scheduled to take effect on March 4 but later toughened its stance after a Canadian advertisement featuring Republican icon Ronald Reagan criticizing tariff increases reportedly irritated the Trump administration.

As part of other bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and the European Union announced on August 21 a “framework agreement” setting lower tariff ceilings, effectively delaying or avoiding higher rates while talks progressed.

In general, Washington expects trade partners to align more closely with U.S. positions on national security, economic, and foreign policy issues.

This week, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Mr. Trump signed reciprocal trade agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia and completed the framework for similar deals with Thailand and Vietnam.

Under those agreements, the U.S. will maintain “reciprocal” tariffs currently in place—19% for Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand, and 20% for Vietnam—but will eliminate them for a specific list of products (details yet to be disclosed). In return, those countries will virtually eliminate their own tariffs on U.S. goods.

Key provisions in these agreements include: tariffs; removal of non-tariff barriers on U.S. industrial and agricultural exports; elimination of obstacles to digital trade, services, and investment; rules on geographical indications and market access; protection of intellectual property rights; anti-piracy measures; stronger economic security alignment; labor and environmental protections; and limits on state-owned enterprises and subsidies.

The U.S.-Malaysia deal offers a preview of what might be proposed to Brazil.

Malaysia agreed to lower import tariffs on U.S. products and waive import licensing requirements. It also confirmed plans to buy—or facilitate purchases by Malaysian companies of—U.S. goods. The country pledged nondiscriminatory or preferential market access for U.S. industrial and agricultural products and vowed not to sign agreements with third countries that impose non-scientific technical standards, discriminatory sanitary or phytosanitary measures, or other rules incompatible with U.S. or international norms.

Malaysia will also provide a “robust standard” of intellectual property protection and extend to the U.S. any trade in services commitments it grants in deals with other partners. The country agreed to ban imports of goods made with forced or compulsory labor, uphold internationally recognized labor rights, and address labor issues contributing to non-reciprocal trade.

Environmental commitments include enforcing domestic laws, maintaining strong governance frameworks, and tackling environmental issues that distort trade. Malaysia also pledged not to apply value-added taxes or digital service taxes that discriminate against U.S. companies.

The agreement devotes significant space to digital trade. Malaysia will refrain from imposing taxes on digital services or other levies that discriminate against U.S. firms and will promote digital commerce with the U.S. by avoiding restrictive measures. It will also consult Washington before entering new digital trade agreements that could compromise essential U.S. interests.

If the U.S. imposes import restrictions—such as tariffs, quotas, or bans—on a third country for reasons related to economic or national security, Malaysia will be notified for coordination purposes. If Washington determines that Malaysia is cooperating to address shared security and economic concerns, such cooperation may be considered when applying U.S. export controls, investment reviews, and related measures.

Should Malaysia sign a free trade or preferential economic agreement with another country that undermines U.S. interests, Washington may terminate its bilateral deal with Kuala Lumpur if consultations fail to resolve its concerns.

The agreement also commits Malaysia to facilitate and promote U.S. investment in sectors such as critical minerals, energy resources, power generation, telecommunications, transportation, and infrastructure services.

In particular, the pact opens the door to cooperation on critical and rare-earth minerals. Malaysia pledged the “expedited development” of these sectors in partnership with U.S. companies, including: (1) refraining from banning or limiting exports of critical minerals or rare-earth elements to the U.S.; (2) granting extended operating permits to ensure expanded production capacity; and (3) guaranteeing unrestricted sales of rare-earth magnets to U.S. firms.

Malaysia also committed to facilitate up to $70 billion in job-creating investments in the United States over the next decade, including funding for new projects.

*By Assis Moreira — Kuala Lumpur

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

10/27/2025

United States President Donald Trump floated this week a plan to turn to Argentine beef in an attempt to reduce prices of the product in the U.S. market—and, ironically, the idea could have a Brazilian meatpacker as its main beneficiary. Minerva is the largest exporter of the product in South America and also leads shipments in the Argentine market.

Minerva has a slaughter capacity of 5,978 cattle head per day in Argentina, according to data from the company’s most recent financial statement. “It’s not official yet, but [if the U.S. goes ahead with the plan] it greatly favors Minerva, which is the largest beef exporter from Argentina among all industries in the country,” said a source familiar with the matter. Sources and analysts told Valor that, if Mr. Trump moves forward with the idea, it would also have a positive indirect effect on another Brazilian company’s operations in Argentina, MBRF.

Mr. Trump argues that importing Argentine beef could be a way out to reduce prices of the product in the U.S., but this effect would actually be quite limited. In September, Argentina exported 71,300 tonnes of beef, of which 3,900 tonnes went to the U.S. market, the Argentine Meat Exporters Consortium (ABC) reported this week.

For comparison, even with the 50% surcharge that went into effect in August, Brazil is still exporting to the U.S. nearly 10,000 tonnes of the product per month, according to the Brazilian Association of Meat Exporting Industries (ABIEC). In July, the last month before the surcharge, the volume was 18,200 tonnes.

“Argentina is not large enough to cause a significant impact on beef prices [in the U.S.],” said Caleb Hurst, a protein analyst at S&P Global Commodity Insights, in a report. According to Mr. Hurst, to make a difference in prices in the U.S. domestic market, the amount of imported beef would have to be at least 200,000 tonnes. Argentina sells to the U.S. less than 2% of that.

The U.S. cattle herd, at about 80 million head, is now the smallest in the last 75 years, and the tight supply has driven prices in the country to record levels. The 50% surcharge on Brazilian products made Brazilian beef exports to the U.S. in large volumes unfeasible, which accentuated the tight supply situation—and rising prices.

A source said that an increase in U.S. demand would have the potential to even reduce the negative impact of 5% on revenue that Minerva expected when Mr. Trump announced the tariff hike. The company ships beef to the U.S. via Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

Leonardo Alencar, head of agribusiness, food and beverages at XP, noted that the Argentine industry has some very different aspects from the Brazilian one. One is fragmentation; several smaller meatpackers are exporters. With this, he says, Minerva is indeed the largest in the country “and should be, yes, the biggest beneficiary of a potential increase in U.S. demand for Argentine beef.”

The specialist notes that this increase in demand, by itself, would not cause a transformation in Argentine shipments because the country is already authorized to sell to the U.S. and does not have the same available volume that Brazil would have to export. However, Mr. Trump’s stance is another positive factor for meatpackers operating in the neighboring country. Recently, Argentine President Javier Milei eliminated export tariffs on various agricultural products, including meats.

Minerva and MBRF did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

*By Nayara Figueiredo, Globo Rural — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

10/27/2025 

Brazil’s carbon market is just the beginning. “We’re setting up something deeply important and strategic for the nation,” said economist Cristina Reis, chosen to head the Extraordinary Secretariat for the Carbon Market, which the Ministry of Finance is now structuring. “The carbon market is pure industrial policy,” she added. “It’s the future.”

The new secretariat will act as the executive body, giving the initial push to the carbon market law enacted in December. Under this law, Brazil will have a system with emission limits and tradable allowances among companies that emit the most carbon, a “cap-and-trade” mechanism. The ministry will define methodologies, monitor progress, and allocate emission quotas across sectors.

In Ms. Reis’s view, the step is far broader. “Decarbonization projects will unleash a vast network of science, technology, and innovation, integrating Brazil into strategic global value chains,” she said. Ms. Reis has not yet been officially appointed to the position and continues to serve as undersecretary for sustainable economic development at the Finance Ministry. She plans to invite José Pedro Neves, her right-hand man, to serve as deputy secretary. “We must prepare to have a strong, large, and powerful exchange—one that’s not dependent on others,” she said.

Agency within two years

“We hope to establish, within two years, a governing body similar to a regulatory agency. We need something permanent and robust,” she said. “But since such a decision takes time, we thought it best to create an interim structure to lay the groundwork for the regulated carbon market—and later transition to a more definitive body.”

The undersecretariat where she currently works—the Undersecretariat for Sustainable Economic Development under the Finance Ministry’s Secretariat for Economic Policy—will continue handling taxonomy, the bioeconomy plan, and several other topics. “The carbon market, however, will move to the new structure,” she noted.

New structure

“We’ll have two undersecretariats,” Ms. Reis added. “One will handle regulation and methodologies and will be led by Ana Paula Machado, currently undersecretary of the Climate Plan at the Ministry of the Environment. She knows the subject well—she worked at the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC). She participated in Corsia (the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation, a program of the International Civil Aviation Organization for reducing and offsetting CO₂ emissions from international flights).”

“This undersecretariat will have two divisions: one for methodologies and another for regulatory impact analysis. The regulatory impact team will define which activities, sources, facilities, sectors, and greenhouse gases are covered. The other will accredit carbon-credit methodologies that may be accepted as offsets in the regulated market.”

Regulated and voluntary markets

“The voluntary market already exists,” Ms. Reis said. “It’s based on bilateral transactions—contracts between a company and another party that reduce or remove carbon in any sector.”

“Law 15,042 created the regulated market. It requires large emitters—those releasing more than 25,000 tonnes of greenhouse gases per year—to decarbonize,” she said.

To that end, the governing body will set an emission cap and the allowances each regulated entity will have to meet its targets—the “cap and trade.” “Each regulated company will have its own allowance: if it meets it, great; if not, it will have to buy from someone with a surplus.”

“Our system allows companies to buy carbon credits from the voluntary market, but not just any credit,” Ms. Reis noted. “It must be generated under a methodology accredited by the governing body—and that’s the job of this division.”

“For example, a cement producer that has already reached its emission limit has two options: it can buy credits from another company that has reduced emissions beyond its quota, or it can go to the voluntary market and purchase credits from a forest regeneration project using a methodology accredited by the secretariat.”

Strategic planning

“The other undersecretariat will be led by Thiago Barral, former National Secretary for Energy Transition and Planning at the Ministry of Mines and Energy,” Ms. Reis said. “It will focus on implementation and will include two divisions: one for MRV studies—monitoring, reporting, and verification—and another for registries.”

“The MRV division will determine how companies will report their emissions, how monitoring and verification will be carried out, and how this information will feed into the National Allocation Plan. This plan will set emission limits, annual reduction targets, and rules for allocating credits—whether free or paid.”

“The other division will create the system’s registry,” she explains. “That’s where the regulated companies will submit their data: ‘This year, I emitted this much, from this activity.’ This dataset will help us continuously refine the policy.”

Strong exchange

“This undersecretariat will also structure how, in the future, the registry and the system’s assets—the allowances to be distributed—will interact with the stock exchanges,” Ms. Reis added. “Now that we have a regulated carbon market taking shape, a law that can boost the voluntary market, and international transfers that may eventually be traded on exchanges, we must prepare to have a strong, large, and powerful exchange—one that is not dependent on others.”

“As for whether we’ll work with the São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro stock exchange, no decision has been made yet,” she added.

Liquidity

“Carbon credits can be traded on the stock exchange,” Ms. Reis noted. “Today, volumes are still small, but they tend to grow.”

“The system’s assets—that is, the allowances—have been defined as securities under the governance and regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM). This ensures the desired liquidity for both the allowances and carbon credits, giving market participants more confidence in these transactions.”

“The financial dimension of carbon markets is highly relevant,” she said.

Start

“We’ll have a testing phase and distribution of allowances within the regulated system—aimed at companies that emit more than 25,000 tonnes of CO₂ per year,” Ms. Reis said. “This phase will begin in four years.”

“After that, there will be a mandatory phase, when companies will have to buy these allowances through auctions—the law sets this to happen in five years,” she added.

“Four years is the time this secretariat has to get everything ready—conduct studies, draft regulations, and issue the necessary ministerial ordinances.”

Building it up

“We’re putting in place something of enormous importance that could have major relevance for the country,” Ms. Reis said. “Minister Fernando Haddad is being bold and innovative by establishing this secretariat within the Finance Ministry. He sees it as both a business opportunity and a way to integrate Brazil technologically into strategic value chains.”

“These decarbonization projects will unleash a vast network of science, technology, and innovation,” she added. “We already have universities, laboratories, and research institutes developing solutions to decarbonize different sectors—what we lacked was demand and scale.”

“With regulation, the carbon market can foster this ecosystem related to science, technology, and innovation, while also strengthening the economic, financial, and legal dimensions of the transition,” she added.

“Just imagine how many consulting firms will emerge,” Ms. Reis said. “We expect a significant impact on the corporate services sector. We must start right away—and do so transparently. We’ll also have to develop an engagement and communication plan. There’s a lot of pressure and anticipation surrounding the carbon market. We must be ready—there are countless possibilities, and now it’s up to the government to regulate and chart this path.”

Sectors

“The question of which sectors we’ll begin with is the most important one,” Ms. Reis said. “The regulatory impact analysis will determine that—we don’t yet have an answer. This will be one of the first decisions the secretariat will make.”

“The testing phase with free allowances will last four years,” she said. “We don’t call them licenses, as the Europeans do; the law uses the term allowances. In Portuguese, license sounded like permission to pollute—and that’s not the idea. It’s an allowance that must be complied with.”

Certification companies

“This is one of the areas causing the most excitement,” Ms. Reis said. “The certification sector is highly concentrated—there are only a few players doing this work. The law stipulates that certification firms must have a minimum capital in Brazil. So, if a company is foreign, it will have to register a business taxpayer number here. It can be headquartered abroad, but it must open a branch in Brazil.”

“Another major discussion concerns methodologies—whether they’re appropriate for our reality,” she added. “That’s why there’s a growing defense of national certification companies, with homegrown methodologies developed by Embrapa and universities. We believe it’s the right time to promote competition in this sector.”

“What’s essential,” she said, “is to properly assess the environmental benefit and the generation of carbon credits—whether the project removes, reduces, retains, or captures emissions. There are many different methodologies.”

“The next step,” she added, “is international recognition, which is still limited today. This debate is already underway, and Brazil will continue to push for clarity—that the needs of the Global South are different. But we also have to look at our companies and ask whether they want to export carbon credits or seek an international seal of approval. And again, that’s precisely the role of the methodology undersecretariat.”

Industrial policy

“I’m a specialist in sustainable industrial policy,” Ms. Reis said. “A country’s development depends on transforming its productive structure to reduce technological dependence. That means developing our own technologies—with inclusion, reduced inequality, and environmental and climate sustainability.”

“The carbon market is industrial policy,” she said. “We’ll define the sectors that will be included, the methodologies, and the allocation of allowances—all of which will become pathways for industrial development.”

“Europe has had its carbon market, the ETS (Emissions Trading System), for 20 years,” she noted. “It has generated €200 billion in revenue. And the use of that revenue has also been strategic: Europeans channeled it into three funds—for innovation, just transition, and modernization. These financed the modernization and innovation of European industry, which had been struggling to compete with Chinese and American companies.”

“In our case, 75% of the revenue from Brazil’s carbon market will go to the Climate Fund, with a portion dedicated to supporting forest projects involving traditional communities and Indigenous peoples. We also have the capacity to promote the development of future technologies.”

“So, the system must be very well regulated, and with a strategic national vision—one that ensures Brazil plays a stronger role in global value chains,” she added. “The carbon market belongs to the future.”

Social cost of carbon

“The carbon market is one more instrument for mitigation,” Ms. Reis said. “It’s not the only one, but it’s a consistent one. Today, about 40 jurisdictions apply a carbon price, covering almost 30% of global emissions. That’s significant.”

“The regulated market targets large emitters, those causing harm to a public good, and ensures they internalize the social cost of carbon,” she said.

Proposal for COP30

“We’ll be working on Brazil’s proposal for the Open Coalition of Regulated Carbon Markets, which should be presented at the United Nations Climate Conference (COP30) in Belém, next November,” Ms. Reis said.

*By Daniela Chiaretti — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

 

10/27/2025

India has increasingly attracted the attention of Brazilian businesses in recent years. Between July 2023 and August 2024, 77 Brazilian trade missions visited the country, more than double the number seen in comparable periods in previous years. Companies such as Embraer, Taurus, Tramontina, and Petrobras are among those already operating in India or seeking to expand their presence there.

Kenneth Félix Haczynski da Nóbrega, Brazil’s ambassador to India and Bhutan, told Valor that over half of the missions were either multisectoral or focused on agriculture and aerospace/defense. Other key areas included technology, healthcare, and energy.

Both countries, members of the BRICS bloc, have strengthened ties following trade tensions triggered by U.S. President Donald Trump, which affected industries in both Brazil and India.

Defense companies worldwide have begun seeking partnerships to reduce their technological dependence on powers such as the United States and France. This movement led the Abu Dhabi-based defense technology company Edge Group to invest more than $550 million in Brazil since March 2023.

Embraer is also stepping up efforts. The Brazilian aerospace company recently opened an office in India, primarily to support negotiations with the Indian government for the potential sale of up to 80 units of its KC-390 military transport aircraft.

Just over a week ago, when it inaugurated the new office, Embraer announced an agreement with Indian conglomerate Mahindra to advance a project that could lead to local production of the KC-390.

Also in the defense sector, Taurus and CBC (Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos) are operating in India through joint ventures with local companies.

Tramontina, meanwhile, opened a factory in the Indian state of Karnataka this year—its first manufacturing plant outside Brazil—via a joint venture with the Indian firm Aequs.

Oil supply

Another strategic priority for India is securing petroleum supply partnerships. In February, executives from Petrobras visited India to finalize a deal with state-owned Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL).

According to Petrobras, India accounted for 4% of its oil exports in 2024. The country, which is the world’s third-largest oil importer, met about 85% of its oil demand through imports last year.

Brazil’s Central Bank reported in its 2024 Foreign Direct Investment Report that the stock of Brazilian direct investment in India reached $122 million at the end of 2023, a record high. Between 2014 and 2023, this investment grew by an average of 11.5% per year. Still, Brazil’s nominal investment in India remains small, representing less than 1% of its total global FDI stock.

“India is currently governed by a party with a very clear national vision. They’re building a network of international partnerships to support their rise, and I would say Brazil is among the countries they see as strategic, not just politically, but economically and technologically,” said Mr. Nóbrega. With business activity on the rise, the Brazilian Embassy is considering a new headquarters in the country.

Bilateral trade

In 2024, Brazilian imports from India totaled $6.8 billion, while exports reached $5.3 billion, based on trade data. From 2004 to 2024, India rose from 29th to 13th place among Brazil’s top export destinations, according to a June report by ApexBrasil, the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency. Since 2019, Brazil’s global exports have grown by an average of 7.3% per year, while exports to India have increased by 13.7%.

India’s economic growth is central to addressing some of its major domestic challenges, including widespread malnutrition. In this context, agricultural partnerships, especially in technology, play a key role in the Brazil–India relationship.

“Brazil is seen as a country capable of providing supplies and technology in key areas like agriculture,” said Ambassador Nóbrega, emphasizing the absence of geopolitical tensions between the two nations.

More than 50% of India’s population currently lives in rural areas, while over 80% of Brazil’s population is urban. Despite India’s significant agricultural output, the sector remains under-mechanized, creating an opportunity for Brazilian technology and expertise to fill the gap.

Wagner Antunes, head of trade at Brazil’s Embassy in India, highlighted the strong interest in defense and aviation. “Brazil has managed to build a solid and diversified industry,” he said.

The reporter traveled at the invitation of IATA.

*By Cristian Favaro — New Delhi

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

10/23/2025 

With 86.8% of its installed power already derived from renewable sources—and set to receive 63% of Brazil’s upcoming solar projects and 89% of new wind projects—the Northeast region has emerged as the natural hub for investments in “powershoring,” the relocation of industrial chains seeking decarbonization and energy security. The region also hosts 18 industrial hubs with energy-intensive operations that could be transitioned to clean energy sources.

These findings are part of a study by Ceplan, a consulting firm, which will be presented on Thursday (23) at a seminar on accelerating powershoring investments in the region. The event is organized by the Northeast Consortium, Banco do Nordeste, and the Climate and Society Institute (iCS).

According to the report, the 18 industrial zones are distributed as follows: two in Maranhão (Açailândia and São Luís); three in Ceará (Caucaia, Eusébio, and Maracanaú); four in Pernambuco (Cabo de Santo Agostinho, Igarassu, Ipojuca, and Paulista); four in Alagoas (Coruripe, Marechal Deodoro, Rio Largo, and São Luís do Quitunde); and five in Bahia (Camaçari, Candeias, Feira de Santana, Simões Filho, and Vitória da Conquista).

These cities are home to industries that require high energy consumption, such as metallurgy and steelmaking, chemicals, food production, non-metallic minerals, rubber and plastic manufacturing, textiles, and automotive production.

“These industries serve both the domestic and export markets and could transition to renewable energy as a strategy to attract foreign investors who must demonstrate to shareholders that their operations are decarbonized,” explains Paulo Ferraz Guimarães, an economist and one of the study’s authors.

He notes that shifting an industry’s energy source is not a simple process. “It often requires adjustments in procedures, machinery, and possibly in production methods,” he says. However, he adds that this transition also represents an opportunity to adopt more efficient and sustainable production processes and strengthen integration into global value chains.

The conversion of existing industrial plants is only one path to powershoring expansion in Brazil. With 45.1 gigawatts of installed capacity and another 104.6 GW projected for development, along with robust port infrastructure and proximity to major consumer markets such as Europe and the United States, the Northeast is a natural destination for decarbonization projects, says Jorge Arbache, economist at the University of Brasília and Valor columnist, who coined the term “powershoring.”

“The question,” he points out, “is why this agenda has not progressed as quickly as anticipated.”

“I believe there are two main explanations,” says Mr. Arbache. “First, trade in green products faces multiple obstacles from developed countries, including both tariff and non-tariff barriers, which have become major roadblocks to progress. This agenda creates significant friction in sectors that lack the same conditions for producing, for example, green steel, green ceramics, or green hydrogen. Direct competition in these areas would be clearly detrimental to some companies,” he notes, citing as an example the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)—a tax the European Union will begin imposing in 2026 on the carbon emissions embedded in imported products.

“The issue is that without trade, there is no investment,” Mr. Arbache summarizes. “Many countries still fail to grasp that powershoring is essential to combat green inflation—the rise in prices driven by the need to invest in more sustainable processes and inputs,” he laments.

The second challenge, he says, lies in the lack of coordination and political commitment among the federal and state governments to advance the agenda. “The Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) program, for instance, only touches on the issue indirectly. Companies need to see a stronger signal of commitment, such as the creation of dedicated funds and de-risking mechanisms to support these initiatives. States also need better coordination; they can’t each go their own way,” he argues.

A similar lack of coordination can be seen in financing, adds Mr. Guimarães. While the country faces energy oversupply at certain times of day—forcing the National Electric System Operator (ONS) to instruct renewable plants to reduce or halt generation (curtailment)—most available financial resources remain focused on expanding supply rather than optimizing use.

Despite these hurdles, Mr. Arbache points out that fuels have been one of the few areas showing faster progress. The former vice president for the private sector at the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) explains: “It’s one of the few areas where compliance speaks for itself. Decarbonization rules have already been established, and companies are required to meet them—it’s not optional. But other high-emission sectors, such as steel, aluminum, and petrochemicals, which together account for roughly 30% of global emissions, also need to decarbonize. There’s no alternative.”

He adds that the key challenge is finding financially viable solutions. “These solutions don’t exist in many parts of Europe, the United States, or Japan. In fact, several of these countries have scaled back their energy transition investments, which only widens the opportunity for Brazil and the Northeast to take the lead.”

*By Marcelo Osakabe — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/