11/24/2025 

Like the historic United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which led to the adoption of three environmental conventions addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and desertification, COP30 will have a lasting impact. The first UN climate conference ever held in the Amazon rainforest—and the first at a moment when major ecosystems are nearing irreversible tipping points—was also the first to confront the fossil-fuel problem head-on and attempt to propose a way out: a global roadmap to phase out oil, gas, and coal. That effort ultimately failed, but after COP30 it will be hard for governments to speak only about the symptoms of climate breakdown.

COP30 nearly fell apart because of the ambition behind the proposal. On Wednesday night, in the final stretch of negotiations, shortly after President Lula and Environment Minister Marina Silva argued that the conference needed to create a mandate—a task force or any mechanism capable of planting the seeds for two roadmaps, one for ending fossil fuels and another for ending deforestation—the talks hit their most dramatic moment. Lula had met with representatives from key countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, and Egypt to discuss the possibility of mentioning fossil fuels directly in the negotiating text.

That move triggered a forceful reaction from a coalition of 82 countries. China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were joined by dozens of others—including India, Indonesia, Russia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela—in demanding an emergency meeting with COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago. They threatened to bring down the entire “mutirão” process if the next draft text mentioned fossil fuels at all. The Arab group, representing 22 countries including Saudi Arabia, went further: if any COP30 decision referenced fossil fuels, they warned, the entire conference would collapse.

On Thursday, Brazilian diplomats began drafting a new text to bring the process back on track. Then a fire broke out in the Blue Zone facilities. Once safety was restored, negotiators resumed work, producing pre-dawn drafts stripped of any reference to fossil fuels or roadmaps. It became clear that it was impossible to face the monster with only a few warriors on board.

Instead, the strategy shifted to securing outcomes that could resonate in the future. The “mutirão” text includes a strong affirmation of multilateralism and states unequivocally that the energy transition is irreversible—a unified message from 194 countries to U.S. President Donald Trump. In the fragmented geopolitical landscape of 2025, such consensus is far from trivial. Another important step: for the first time, there is a formal decision to move the climate regime from negotiation to implementation, acknowledging the urgency of the crisis and the need to accelerate action and cooperation.

The conference’s main deliverable is a global implementation accelerator, modeled on the existing action agenda. It is expected to serve as a platform to channel solutions and speed up the transition, buying time in the climate fight by cutting methane emissions and boosting carbon-removal initiatives such as forest restoration. The accelerator is also meant to trigger what negotiators call “positive tipping points,” cascading effects in which climate solutions reinforce each other. The presidents of COP30 and COP31 will guide how the mechanism will operate.

Another outcome was the decision to triple adaptation finance. Brazil’s presidency had to negotiate with the EU, which resisted making new commitments on its own. The compromise shifted the target year from 2030 to 2035 and stated that the $120 billion pledged by developed countries for developing nations would come from all sources.

COP30 also established a just-transition mechanism, a gender action plan, and global adaptation goals, although these will continue to be refined. Here, Brazil’s presidency faced an unexpected challenge: countries such as Colombia and Panama objected to the indicators for measuring adaptation progress, creating tension in the plenary. The dispute was resolved on the spot, but it set a troubling precedent. Colombia, insisting on referencing fossil fuels, threatened to block the texts. At a critical moment, Colombia and Panama demanded that no delegation ever be ignored again. The Saudi delegation immediately backed the idea of giving any country the power to veto decisions, a precedent that many fear could undermine the entire climate regime.

*By Daniela Chiaretti — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

11/24/2025

As Brazil faces a historic opportunity to transform its reserves of critical minerals, strategic minerals, and rare earths into a high-value industry, the government, the productive sector, and specialists are still debating how to unlock this chain. Some defend the implementation of specific incentives to offset the high costs and long investment-return cycles, while others argue that global scarcity and strong demand already give the country sufficient leverage to negotiate local production without necessarily relying on broad subsidies. The consensus, however, is that Brazil now holds “bargaining power” to carve out space in this market.

This diagnosis comes amid growing recognition that the energy transition and geopolitical shifts have, for the first time, created an environment in which countries possessing these minerals can exercise real leverage over global supply chains. The combination of structurally rising demand and efforts by the U.S. and Europe to reduce dependence on China has opened an unprecedented window for Brazil to use its geological advantages as a platform for industrialization rather than merely supplying raw materials.

Behind the scenes, government officials say that in the case of critical minerals and rare earths, U.S. interest is focused on securing raw materials with no commitment to local value-added stage, something Brazil does not intend to accept. Some insiders also estimate that a more robust national proposal for the sector will only advance after the 2026 electoral cycle. The creation of an incentive policy remains a point of contention.

The interim president of the Brazilian Geological Survey (SGB), Valdir Silveira, says Brazil produces more than 90 mineral goods demanded worldwide but must recognize this window of opportunity and decide what type of mineral industry it wants to develop: extract and export raw materials as is done today; export only what exceeds domestic industry needs; or fully verticalize production.

According to him, the current trend is to sell raw materials to other countries, but he believes the intermediate option is the most suitable for now, as it fosters supply-chain development while generating trade surpluses, jobs, and income.

Starting from this approach, he says, it would later be possible to develop the entire chain and offer finished products. However, he stresses that beyond the materials themselves, Brazil will also need, and is in a position, to negotiate alongside other nations, since most technologies are dominated by foreign countries. “We must use mineral goods as bargaining chips. I supply them, but in return, technology must be brought in for developing the chain. That would be the most appropriate path.”

Echoing this view, Jorge Arbache, a economics professor at the University of Brasília (UnB), also highlights the unprecedented bargaining power of countries that hold these resources. He says Brazil, with strong potential and only 27% of its territory prospected, can condition access to deposits on the gradual addition of value within its borders, reducing reliance on raw-material exports.

“This bargaining power is increasingly visible and will become even more so in the coming years and decades. There is no reason for the government, Congress, and other leaders not to discuss an agenda that is entirely reasonable and far from new,” he told Valor.

According to Arbache, subsidies may accelerate certain processes in some chains but are not always essential, especially for highly attractive minerals. For this reason, such incentives should not be treated generically, he says. The greater the strategic value of the input and the fewer the alternative suppliers, the lower the need for government incentives.

He notes that projects involving critical minerals and rare earths tend to be profitable despite exploration risks, since expectations of strong price appreciation increase potential returns and justify long-term investments. In such cases, investors, and even governments like that of the U.S., are more willing to assume risks and pay premiums to secure access to reserves.

Brazil’s main gap today, according to Arbache, is the lack of a national strategy for mineral policy, one capable of distinguishing critical from strategic minerals and guiding decisions according to national interests. Each supply chain has its own dynamics and requires specific policies. “For example, demand for lithium is projected to grow significantly over the coming years and decades. We need to understand today’s nuances. What we need now is an intelligent, well-informed, medium- and long-term strategy,” he explains.

The debate is also gaining traction in Congress. In the Chamber of Deputies, congressman Arnaldo Jardim (Citizenship of São Paulo) is the rapporteur for a bill authored by deputy Zé Silva (Solidarity of Minas Gerais) that defines criteria for prioritizing minerals. The proposal foresees tax and regulatory incentives to attract investments and creates the Committee on Critical and Strategic Minerals (CMCE). The most sensitive point, which still is under negotiation, involves the chapter on tax incentives, which depends on discussions with the Ministry of Finance.

“We will set clear guidance in the legislation so that Brazil is not merely an exporter of commodities, but develops beneficiation and even transformation—higher stages in the mineral value-added process,” Jardim told Valor.

He says the bill will establish processing levels that scale up support as companies expand their activities domestically. In other words, the greater the value added domestically, the greater the incentive.

By Giordanna Neves and Marlla Sabino — Brasília

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

11/24/2025 

Even from 18,000 kilometers away, the war between Russia and Ukraine has stalled construction of the West-East Integration Railway (FIOL) in Bahia. In April, Bahia Mineração (Bamin)—the company responsible for building the line—suspended work on Section 1, which connects Caetité to Ilhéus. The company, controlled by the Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) and headquartered in Kazakhstan, has been heavily affected by the war’s economic fallout.

“Unfortunately, Bamin faced a serious problem due to the war and ran out of resources to carry out [FIOL 1]. The government is treating this matter as a priority, and I believe it will be resolved,” said Jorge Bastos, president of Infra S.A., at a Valor event in late October.

Bamin declined to comment. However, at the end of October, company president Eduardo Ledsham addressed the issue during the opening of Exposibram, a mining congress held in Salvador. He confirmed that the company had been hit by the economic repercussions of the conflict and has since been seeking ways to raise the R$5.7 billion required to resume construction.

“We are working with three concrete proposals [from potential investors], all interested in an integrated project—the mine, railway, and port,” said Mr. Ledsham, noting that about R$4.8 billion is already secured through federal government credit lines. The remaining funds are expected to come from a new partner in the venture.

The linchpin of the plan is the completion of FIOL 1, which, although currently suspended, is 62% complete, according to Mr. Ledsham. The new investor should be confirmed by early next year. However, the partnership’s restructuring will require renegotiating the concession contract, as the company has requested an extension of the completion deadline from 2027 to 2031. “It’s a natural process. A project of this scale demands adjustments to timelines and responsibilities, always in dialogue with the Ministry of Transport and ANTT [National Land Transport Agency],” said the executive.

Both Bamin and the federal government view the integration of rail logistics, agribusiness, and mining as key to the Northeast’s economic transformation, linking the railway to other logistics corridors. Alongside FIOL, the Porto Sul project in Ilhéus, still on the drawing board, is seen as a strategic hub that could reduce freight costs by up to 40%, according to Mr. Ledsham’s estimates.

Bamin owns the Pedra de Ferro mine in Caetité, which has an annual production capacity of up to 2 million tonnes of high-grade iron ore (65% concentration)—a level that draws intense interest from international buyers. However, the company’s ability to export depends on the completion of the FIOL railway, the essential link between the mine and export terminals.

According to Infra S.A. president Jorge Bastos, completing FIOL is strategically important because it connects mineral and agricultural production to the port system. “FIOL 2 [Guanambi-Caetité] is now in full swing. We’ve resolved most of the bottlenecks and are putting nearly all sections out to tender to complete construction as quickly as possible,” Mr. Bastos said.

Despite this optimism, an audit by the Federal Accounting Court (TCU) has identified “significant delays” in project execution. “After nine months of work—out of a total contract term of 26 months—only 3% has been completed, with no executive project approved and no construction stages initiated. This represents delays of nine months for design and four months for construction,” the court reported in October.

The TCU cautioned Infra S.A. that failing to take action against contractors who are not meeting deadlines or contractual obligations could constitute an oversight by the agency itself. However, it also recommended that each case be assessed individually. Currently, half of the 485 kilometers that make up FIOL 2 already have tracks installed.

Meanwhile, FIOL 3, covering 840 kilometers between Mara Rosa (Goiás) and Correntina (Bahia), remains in the planning phase. All FIOL sections are part of the East-West Railway Corridor, a project deemed strategic by the Ministry of Transport. The plan is to link FIOL with the Midwest Integration Railway (FICO) to create a logistics corridor for grain and ethanol transport from the Midwest to the Northeast and to international markets.

The Ministry of Transport expects to launch the bidding process for the corridor’s concession in the first half of 2026.

*By Marina Lang — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

11/12/2025

The surge of steel exports from China continues to challenge the Latin American steel industry, according to experts gathered at the Latin American Steel Association (Alacero) congress in Cartagena, Colombia. Jorge Oliveira, president of Alacero and of ArcelorMittal Brazil, warned on Tuesday (11) that the situation is more concerning than in previous years, with few answers to the growing influx of Chinese steel in the region. “The reality shows that, despite our efforts, Latin America’s steel market is deteriorating due to global overcapacity from Asia,” he said.

Mr. Oliveira noted that Latin American producers have been forced to scale back investments and reduce production. “Chile’s largest steel producer, Huachipato, has shut down operations. Geopolitical tensions are affecting the entire supply chain, as well as commodity and logistics prices. We must find effective responses to face this challenging environment,” he said.

Data confirms the concern. Between January and September 2025, Brazil imported 5.075 million tonnes of steel products from all sources, up 9.7% year over year, according to the Instituto Aço Brasil. Imports from China alone jumped 25.9% over the same period, reaching 3.1 million tonnes. Chinese steel accounted for 61.1% of Brazil’s total steel imports, 7.9 percentage points higher than a year earlier.

Over the same period, Brazilian steel output fell 1.7% to 24.982 million tonnes, down from 25.419 million in 2024. According to Alacero, China produces in 20 days what the entire Latin American steel industry produces in a year. In Brazil’s case, Chinese mills generate the country’s annual output in just 12 days.

“Latin America is losing its development potential. Our trade defense barriers are too weak,” said Ezequiel Tavernelli, Alacero’s executive director. He added, “Latin American economies are becoming more dependent on raw materials than manufactured goods. The region is deindustrializing.”

Mr. Tavernelli warned that China’s influence could become a social problem for Latin America, as a slowdown in the steel sector affects a wide industrial chain: “The steel industry creates jobs, drives logistics, and supplies many other industries. Several sectors are hit at once.”

He argued for greater regional integration and stronger trade-defense policies, including higher import tariffs. Brazil’s quota-tariff system shows that import taxes must be higher, he said.

In May, Brazil’s Foreign Trade Chamber (Gecex/Camex), under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services, renewed the country’s steel import quota system through May 2026. The policy imposes a 25% tariff on Chinese steel exceeding the quota, covering 23 product categories.

“Latin America could win if competition were fair,” Mr. Tavernelli said. “Chinese steel is subsidized, from energy costs to transport. Our region has a strong steel industry with real potential, but we can’t compete on such unequal terms.”

At the same event, Oliver Stuenkel, an international relations professor at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), argued that political fragmentation among Latin American governments weakens their collective position. “The lack of unity among Latin American leaders leaves the region more vulnerable. The private sector may have to step in to fill that gap. Acting in isolation, countries are unlikely to find a solution,” he said.

*By Kariny Leal — Cartagena

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

 

11/12/2025 

To reduce methane emissions, it is necessary to know where they come from. The Methane Alert and Response System (MARS) combines near-real-time data from nearly a dozen satellites to continuously monitor the Earth and detect large methane plumes. “These satellites detect only the largest emissions, a small fraction of the total, but they are a powerful tool for identifying and acting on the largest leaks,” explains Giulia Ferrini, head of the International Methane Emissions Observatory (IMEO) of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

Since the system’s operations started in January 2024, 14,500 methane plumes have been detected, and 4,000 alerts have been issued. MARS processed around 200,000 satellite images in just the first eight months of 2025. “By combining AI with deep scientific knowledge, IMEO has increased its ability to monitor the globe for methane emissions tenfold. These efforts are expanding to better monitor methane from the coal and waste sectors,” Ms. Ferrini emphasizes.

While satellites provide a global view, detecting large leaks and critical points from space, aircraft locate specific regions, and drones equipped with sensors fly over facilities to identify the exact source of emissions. Ms. Ferrini says that oil and gas companies use portable sensors, such as optical gas imaging cameras, to detect leaks in specific equipment and correct them.

In Brazil, a system combining the Internet of Things (IoT) and photonic sensing to identify fleeting methane emissions, created by the company Alfa Sense and Brazil’s Center for Research and Development in Telecommunications Foundation (CPQD), received an award from Petrobras and generated a patent application at the Brazilian Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).

“We developed a purely optical, passive sensor that interacts with methane molecules at the leak site. When you have light at the same wavelength, at the same frequency, the methane molecule absorbs that light. We monitor the amount of light absorbed and can detect if methane is present,” explains Marcos Sanches, innovation coordinator at Alfa Sense.

However, the prototype did not become a product. Now, Alfa Sense is engaged in another project. It was selected through NAVE, an entrepreneurship program launched by Brazil’s National Petroleum Agency, to meet Challenge 56, related to advanced technologies for monitoring and controlling greenhouse gas emissions.

Drone uses sensors and artificial intelligence systems to measure concentration of greenhouse gases — Foto: Divulgação
Drone uses sensors and artificial intelligence systems to measure concentration of greenhouse gases — Photo: Divulgação

The São Carlos campus of the University of São Paulo (USP) is developing a drone project that uses sensors and artificial intelligence systems to measure the concentration of greenhouse gases, in order to monitor environmental conditions in forested areas and identify fire outbreaks.

“With drones, we can obtain a profile of gas concentration to detect if there are bubbles, if the gases are concentrating more in the soil, or if they are dissipating into the atmosphere,” explains Antonio Carlos Daud Filho, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of São Paulo. According to him, one of the challenges lies in the fact that low-cost sensors—which are lighter, smaller, and easier to mount on smaller drones—do not have as much precision as more expensive ones.

At Embrapa, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, the main focus, with regard to methane, is to reduce the time cattle spend in the pasture and improve pasture quality and management. “Cattle produce 500 liters of methane per head per day, so extensive agriculture, the kind that leaves cattle in the pasture, typical of Brazil, plays a big role in this,” says Luiz Eduardo Vicente, a researcher on remote sensing and natural resources at Embrapa.

Mr. Vicente points out that the agricultural sector accounts for 76% of Brazil’s methane emissions, of which 5.7% are associated with animal waste management. To address this challenge, the Ministry of Agriculture, Embrapa, and the NGO Instituto 17 launched a tool in August that calculates methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from waste management in livestock farming. ABC+Calc generates systematized data to help achieve the goals of the Adaptation and Low Carbon Emission Plan for Agriculture (ABC+ Plan).

Many Brazilian initiatives, however, make indirect measurements. Created by the Climate Observatory, the Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals Estimation System (SEEG) uses methods and guidelines established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to analyze public and open data to monitor greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors of the economy.

Linked to the SEEG, Ingrid Graces, a researcher at the Institute of Energy and Environment (IEMA), and Iris Coluna, an advisor at ICLEI, a global network focused on sustainable urban development, acknowledge that it is necessary to have more precise emission figures for the various types of activities and regions, with the combination of satellites, drones, and remote sensors. “It’s all still very embryonic, so much so that it’s very difficult to have historical series,” Ms. Graces emphasizes.

Jean Ometto, senior researcher at Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE), adds that methane has been monitored especially using industrial sources, satellites, and cameras that measure wavelengths. There is also equipment placed on meteorological towers to measure gas flows and equipment that detects methane in the air. “With the evolution of nanosatellites, which fly at lower altitudes, potentially, you can conduct experiments more frequently,” predicts Mr. Ometto.

*By Roberta Prescott — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

11/12/2025 

President Lula’s approval rating has stalled, according to a Genial/Quaest poll released on Wednesday (12). The share of respondents who disapprove of his government rose to 50%, up from 49% in October, while approval slipped to 47% from 48%.

The slight declines, within the survey’s margin of error, come as the Lula administration faces growing pressure to engage in the public security debate following a major police operation in Rio de Janeiro last month that left 121 people dead.

Disapproval increased across three of Brazil’s regions: to 38% from 36% in the Northeast region, to 53% from 52% in the Southeast, and to 61% from 56% in the South. On the other hand, the disapproval rating fell in the North/Central-West region, to 51% from 55%.

The Lula administration’s approval ratings also shifted within the margin of error. The share of those who rate the government as “poor” rose to 38% from 37%, while positive evaluations dropped to 31% from 33%. The share describing the administration as “average” went to 28% from 27%.

The survey interviewed 2,004 people between November 6 and 9 and has a two-point margin of error, up or down.

The November results interrupted a recovery trend for Mr. Lula that Quaest had been recording since midyear. July marked the start of a more active federal response to U.S. threats of higher tariffs on Brazilian goods and possible sanctions against Brazilian officials involved in the legal case against former President Jair Bolsonaro over his role in an attempted coup.

According to the pollster, the loss of momentum reflects the fallout from the large-scale police action in Rio. The aftermath of Operation Contenção reignited debate over how to tackle organized crime and highlighted differences between the Lula administration and opposition groups.

Although Mr. Lula described the operation as “disastrous,” 67% of respondents approved of the police action, while 25% disapproved. When asked whether the police used excessive force, 67% said no, compared with 29% who believed they did.

Concern about violence rose notably between October and November, with 38% of respondents naming it as Brazil’s most pressing issue, compared with 30% in the previous poll.

Lula and Trump

President Lula’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on October 26 to discuss the tariff dispute was known to 65% of respondents.

Among those surveyed, 45% said the encounter strengthened Mr. Lula politically, 30% said it weakened him, and 10% saw no change. A majority (51%) believe both leaders will reach an agreement to reduce tariffs, while 39% think they will not.

Economy and prices

Perceptions of the economy, which had been a key driver of negative evaluations of the government, remained mostly stable in November, showing mild signs of improvement for Mr. Lula.

According to the latest poll, 43% of respondents still believe the economy has worsened over the past 12 months, nearly unchanged from 42% in October. However, the share who see improvement rose from 21% to 24%, while those who believe it has stayed the same fell to 32% from 35%.

When asked about food prices, 58% said they had risen in the month prior to the survey, down from 63% in October. Another 23% said prices remained stable (up from 21%), and 27% said they had fallen (up from 15%).

Regarding purchasing power, 72% said Brazilians’ buying power is lower than a year ago (slightly down from 73%), while 16% said it has improved (up from 15%), and 11% said it remains unchanged.

*By Joelmir Tavares and Lilian Venturini — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

 

 

 

11/11/2025

The debate over the bill that establishes Brazil’s Legal Framework on Organized Crime, scheduled for Tuesday (11) in the Chamber of Deputies, has already sparked a fierce political dispute even before reaching the floor. Members of the government are pushing to restore the original text of the Anti-Gang Law, while the Federal Police (PF) has sharply criticized the report prepared by Federal Deputy Guilherme Derrite (Progressives Party, PP, São Paulo).

Government officials argue that appointing Mr. Derrite—currently on leave from his post as São Paulo’s Secretary of Public Security—to draft the report undermines technical debate and politicizes the discussion.

The choice has heightened political tensions ahead of the 2026 elections, since Mr. Derrite belongs to the circle of São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas (Republicans), widely seen as President Lula’s (Workers’ Party, PT) main potential challenger. Government allies have escalated their criticism of both the bill and Chamber Speaker Hugo Motta (Republicans of Paraíba), who appointed Mr. Derrite as rapporteur.

Minister of Institutional RelationsGleisi Hoffmann hinted that the Lula administration is preparing for a political showdown. She said Mr. Derrite’s proposals would serve as a “free pass” for criminal factions and hinder the Federal Police’s work. One of the most controversial provisions would allow the Federal Police to act only “upon request from the state governor.”

According to the minister, if Mr. Derrite insists on maintaining his version, the government will refuse to negotiate and take the dispute to a floor vote, even at the risk of losing. The governing bloc plans to submit an amendment restoring the original text.

Mr. Motta and Ms. Hoffmann were scheduled to meet on Monday evening (10), and the minister said she would express her “concern” over the report. She argued that the Chamber must “undo” the current course before scheduling the vote.

“We need to reverse this. Paralyzing the Federal Police is bad for the country. It will harm Brazil and restrict the Federal Police,” she said, adding that she had asked for a nonpartisan debate. “He [Motta] chose someone [Derrite] with a very specific ideological stance on the issue,” Ms. Hoffmann told GloboNews.

In a statement, the Federal Police said it views the changes with “deep concern.” “Under the report presented, the Federal Police’s historic institutional role in combating crime—particularly against powerful criminals and large-scale organizations—could face significant restrictions. Federal Police operations would depend on requests from state governments, creating a real risk of weakening the fight against organized crime.”

The Federal Police also warned that limiting its powers would compromise investigations into corruption, drug trafficking, embezzlement of public funds, and human trafficking, calling the proposed changes “a serious setback.”

“The original proposal submitted by the Brazilian government aims to strengthen law enforcement against organized crime. However, the version now under discussion in Congress undermines this goal by introducing structural changes that weaken the public interest,” the statement said.

Federal Police members interviewed by Valor also criticized the bill, saying it conflates organized crime and terrorism in several sections—another key point of contention between the government and opposition. One official called the report “terrible” and “legally flawed.”

In a separate statement, the Federal Revenue Service also voiced concerns, arguing that making Federal Police action dependent on “a request from the state governor opens the door to unacceptable interference, weakens federal authority, all in addition to being unconstitutional.”

“The Federal Revenue relies on the independent operation of the Federal Police to continue joint efforts to dismantle the financial structures of criminal organizations,” the agency added.

Mr. Motta said on social media that he helped mediate talks between Mr. Derrite and Federal Police Director-General Andrei Rodrigues to ensure the Federal Police retains its investigative powers against organized crime.

People close to the Chamber speaker defended his prerogative to select the rapporteur, dismissing the backlash as “overblown.” They said Mr. Motta had informed the government of his choice in advance and believes the report is being drafted in a “technical and nonpartisan” manner. According to his aides, Mr. Motta views the bill as “tough but necessary,” not a “witch hunt.”

He believes the proposal could unite the Chamber around a broad consensus, similar to the recent approval of the Digital Child and Adolescent Statute. “No one will want to vote against this,” he said, adding that the issue affects most Brazilian states and carries strong popular appeal.

President Lula reportedly called Mr. Motta to discuss the bill, but according to aides, the Chamber leader remains “calm” about Mr. Derrite’s appointment and expects the final version to reflect a “broad, technical study.” The text will be discussed at a leaders’ meeting on Tuesday.

On Monday, Mr. Motta also met with Attorney General Paulo Gonet Branco and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes to discuss the fight against organized crime, during which the bill was addressed. A separate meeting between Mr. Motta and state governors is scheduled for later this week.

Earlier on GloboNews, Mr. Derrite said his report consolidates proposals from several lawmakers. Responding to criticism from National Secretary of Public Security Mário Sarrubbo that the draft removes key provisions such as “following the money and seizing criminal assets,” Mr. Derrite said those items could be reinstated. “There’s a lot of political ideology involved. The report can be changed before the vote. We can incorporate all suggestions, including that one—which we already apply in São Paulo. And we will preserve the independence of state police forces,” he said.

Mr. Sarrubbo told Valor that Mr. Derrite’s report is “unconstitutional” and effectively equates criminal factions with terrorist groups. On social media, Mr. Derrite said he has been consulting with lawmakers, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and law enforcement professionals “who understand the real challenges on the ground” to shape the text. “This is a cross-party issue, and I’m willing to listen to all sides,” he said.

He added that he had accepted proposals to expand financial sanctions against criminal organizations, create a national registry of gang members, and explicitly bar convicted members from holding public office.

The ruling Workers’ Party (PT) plans to launch a social media campaign linking the debate on the anti-gang framework to the recent controversy over the “shielding amendment,” which weakened corruption probes against lawmakers before being overturned by the Senate. PT strategists hope to use public outrage over that vote to regain momentum in the current debate.

PT national president Edinho Silva called Mr. Derrite’s appointment “disrespectful” to lawmakers and said it politicized the issue. “Brazil won’t confront such a serious challenge by turning this into a campaign platform,” he said.

The PT’s Chamber leader, Lindbergh Farias (Rio de Janeiro), said he was “deeply bothered” by the “terrible” choice of rapporteur, comparing it to “stealing” the authorship of the proposal. He added that the same lawmakers who backed the shielding amendment are now pushing for severe changes to the anti-gang bill.

*By Renan Truffi, Gabriela Guido, Maira Escardovelli, Tiago Angelo, Cristiane Agostine, Joelmir Tavares, Beatriz Roscoe, Murillo Camarotto and Giullia Colombo — Brasília and São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

 

11/11/2025

MBRF, the company created from the merger between Marfrig and BRF, reported a net profit of R$94 million in the third quarter of 2025, a 62% decline compared with the R$248 million earned in the same period of 2024. This is the first earnings report released since the merger was announced in May.

The company’s net revenue reached R$41.8 billion, up 9.2% year over year, driven by a 3.7% increase in total sales volume to 2.1 million tonnes, a record for the group.

Adjusted EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) came in at R$3.5 billion, down 8.6% from a year earlier, while the adjusted EBITDA margin fell to 8.4%, from 10% in the third quarter of 2024. Gross profit totaled R$5.1 billion, a 3% decrease, with a gross margin of 12.3%, compared to 13.9% a year earlier.

According to the company, the figures were compared to Marfrig’s consolidated results, which have included BRF’s data since 2022, when Marfrig became the controlling shareholder. Previously, Marfrig recorded net income attributable to the controlling interest based on its ownership stake in BRF. Following the merger on September 22, Marfrig began to consolidate 100% of BRF’s net profit.

Since the merger occurred near the end of the third quarter, that effect was only partially reflected in the results. If the combination had been in effect for the entire quarter, MBRF’s net income between July and September would have been close to R$200 million, according to sources familiar with the matter.

The report also showed that financial leverage, measured by the ratio of net debt to adjusted EBITDA, stood at 3.09x, essentially flat compared with 3.07x in the same period of 2024.

The consolidated results reflect the performance of the company’s three main business segments. BRF accounted for 39% of total revenue, with a 5.4% increase in net sales but a 14.9% drop in EBITDA. The South American division represented 14% of revenue, with a 31.8% increase in EBITDA, while the North American division accounted for 47% of revenue, up 12.2% year on year.

According to José Ignácio, MBRF’s vice president of finance and investor relations, the lower profit reflects a temporary fluctuation. “The main driver of the decline in net income was BRF’s operational performance, which, although still at very strong and healthy levels, saw a slight year-over-year contraction,” he said in an interview.

Among the factors weighing on BRF’s performance, Mr. Ignácio cited the closure of key export markets for Brazilian poultry, including China, following confirmation of an avian influenza case at a commercial farm in Montenegro, Rio Grande do Sul, in May. With China’s market reopening last Friday, MBRF expects an improvement in BRF’s results in the coming months.

MBRF CEO Miguel Gularte said the quarter was marked by strong commercial performance, with record sales volume and revenue, up 3.7% and 9.2%, respectively. “The quarterly results reinforce MBRF’s potential,” he added.

In Brazil, growth was driven by processed products, with sales volume up 7%. In South America, sales grew nearly 18% year over year, while in the United States, performance remained solid despite a challenging environment. “We maintained strong results in North America, with efficient management of the cattle cycle and stable margins, even amid tighter cattle supply,” said Mr. Ignácio.

The company also reported that of the R$1 billion in synergies identified at the start of the merger process, 60% should be captured within the first year of operations. Of that total, R$231 million are expected from corporate structure optimization, R$470 million from supply chain efficiencies, R$230 million from commercial and logistics improvements, and R$73 million from other initiatives.

*By Cleyton Vilarino, Globo Rural — São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

 

 

 

11/11/2025 

Brazil’s Central Bank introduced on Monday a new set of rules governing risk management in payment arrangements, making it clearer who is financially responsible when a link in the transaction chain fails.

Under the new framework, card networks—which act as the arrangement operators—assume greater responsibilities, though with some flexibility in determining the guarantees they require from other participants. The measures come a year after the Central Bank held a public consultation on the topic, prompted by issues involving the card administrator Credz and travel operator 123 Milhas.

A proposal to create an industry-wide guarantee fund, criticized by market players, was dropped from the final rule. A payment arrangement is a set of rules that enables a specific type of transaction. In the case of cards, the networks (such as Visa and Mastercard) define how participants interact, such as acquirers (the “POS machine” companies) and issuers (typically banks).

The resolution takes effect upon publication, but networks will have 180 days to request authorization for any regulatory adjustments needed to comply. Existing rules remain valid until the Central Bank approves the changes.

According to the Central Bank, the rule makes it explicit that the card network is responsible for ensuring payment of all transactions to the receiving user—without exception. This includes the obligation to use the network’s own funds if existing protection mechanisms prove insufficient.

“The network will be solely responsible for monitoring and managing the risks of arrangement participants. If protection mechanisms are insufficient, it must use its own resources to guarantee payment to merchants,” the Central Bank stated.

The debate over risk management in card arrangements intensified in 2023, after Credz ran into trouble and was ultimately acquired by DM, in a deal involving several market participants—including Visa—to avoid systemic fallout. Concerns also rose around Will Bank, controlled by the same group as Banco Master, prompting Mastercard to engage in talks to find a buyer for the fintech.

An executive from the card industry told Valor that while networks now face higher liability, the clarity is positive. “It’s now very clear that the networks are financially responsible for their arrangements, which should make the market safer,” he said.

A financial lawyer noted that by becoming “guarantors of last resort,” the networks now face credit risk exposure, a shift that could transform the industry.

The Brazilian Association of Credit Card and Service Companies (Abecs), which led private-sector discussions, said only that it is “analyzing the resolution together with its members.” Meanwhile, the Brazilian Association of Payment Institutions (Abipag) welcomed the rule, highlighting progress such as: “The guarantee that merchants will receive payment for all authorized card transactions; improved visibility into settlement processes; and greater transparency in fee collection.”

In earlier drafts, released in October 2023, the BC had suggested a shared guarantee fund financed by market participants. Abecs opposed that model, arguing instead for individualized risk management, where each participant’s exposure corresponds to its own risk profile, with resources held in escrow accounts. The Central Bank accepted this approach, mandating the creation of segregated accounts for settlement funds within each arrangement. However, each network will also be required to maintain its own guarantee reserve for extreme situations.

To balance risks within arrangements, the Central Bank limited the financial liability of other participants in chargeback cases to 180 days. After that period, if permitted under the arrangement’s rules, the card network assumes responsibility.

The resolution also prohibits networks from allowing participants to demand guarantees from one another and forbids acquirers or sub-acquirers from discriminating against specific issuers. In practice, this means risk management will now be fully centralized within the card network, which can no longer delegate oversight of sub-acquirers to acquirers.

“The new rule prevents networks from transferring sub-acquirer risk management to acquirers,” the Central Bank emphasized. According to Vicente Piccoli, partner at FAS Advogados, the rule represents a win for acquirers, freeing them from the duty of monitoring sub-acquirers. “The general trend is to strengthen the responsibilities of the arrangement operator, who has full visibility of the system and is best positioned to manage overall risk,” he said.

Larissa Arruy, partner at Mattos Filho, noted that the Central Bank gave networks a degree of discretion. “My main concern now is the potential market impact. The Central Bank is clearly trying to enhance security in the financial and payment ecosystem—these are positive steps, but the costs remain uncertain.”

For Kenneth Ferreira, a partner with the banking, transactions, and financial services practice of law firm Lefosse, the resolution is “very welcome,” as it harmonizes risk management practices, clarifies responsibilities, increases transparency, and protects financial flows to end users.

“It introduces new concepts, requiring continuous monitoring, stress testing, backtesting, and periodic policy reviews. A key change is that all sub-acquirers must join centralized settlement within 180 days, ensuring traceability of funds. Previously, smaller players were exempt, creating distortions,” he explained.

Visa said it is “evaluating the issue.” Mastercard did not comment. Elo stated that it complies with all Central Bank regulations and is prepared to follow the new directives, adding: “The company already provides a system of guarantees to the market and is ready to align with the new security and transparency standards.”

*By Gabriel Shinohara, Álvaro Campos and Lais Godinho — Brasília and São Paulo

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/