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10/28/2025 

If the Donald Trump administration’s approach to several other countries is any guide, a temporary suspension of existing punitive tariffs on Brazilian goods could be followed by a 90-day deadline to negotiate an agreement on reciprocal trade.

The “gesture of goodwill” requested by Brazil from President Trump is expected to be on the table in Washington next week, pending confirmation of the meeting. Brazil maintains that the 50% tariff penalty is unjustified, a position reiterated both during the meeting between presidents Lula and Trump and in the first working session between their teams the following day in the Malaysian capital.

Temporary tariff suspensions have been a common practice for Washington. That was the case with India, which received a 90-day window, until July 9, to negotiate after the U.S. imposed an additional 26% tariff. When patience with New Delhi ran out, the full 50% rate was enforced.

With China, the agreement reached in May granted a 90-day truce for most tariff hikes, cutting U.S. rates from very high levels to about 30% while talks continued. That truce was later extended to November 10. Mr. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to meet this week, when a deal will likely be finalized.

Similarly, with Mexico, on July 31 the U.S. postponed for about 90 days an additional tariff increase on Mexican imports to allow more time for broader trade discussions that remain ongoing. With Canada, Washington temporarily suspended a tariff hike scheduled to take effect on March 4 but later toughened its stance after a Canadian advertisement featuring Republican icon Ronald Reagan criticizing tariff increases reportedly irritated the Trump administration.

As part of other bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and the European Union announced on August 21 a “framework agreement” setting lower tariff ceilings, effectively delaying or avoiding higher rates while talks progressed.

In general, Washington expects trade partners to align more closely with U.S. positions on national security, economic, and foreign policy issues.

This week, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala Lumpur, Mr. Trump signed reciprocal trade agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia and completed the framework for similar deals with Thailand and Vietnam.

Under those agreements, the U.S. will maintain “reciprocal” tariffs currently in place—19% for Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand, and 20% for Vietnam—but will eliminate them for a specific list of products (details yet to be disclosed). In return, those countries will virtually eliminate their own tariffs on U.S. goods.

Key provisions in these agreements include: tariffs; removal of non-tariff barriers on U.S. industrial and agricultural exports; elimination of obstacles to digital trade, services, and investment; rules on geographical indications and market access; protection of intellectual property rights; anti-piracy measures; stronger economic security alignment; labor and environmental protections; and limits on state-owned enterprises and subsidies.

The U.S.-Malaysia deal offers a preview of what might be proposed to Brazil.

Malaysia agreed to lower import tariffs on U.S. products and waive import licensing requirements. It also confirmed plans to buy—or facilitate purchases by Malaysian companies of—U.S. goods. The country pledged nondiscriminatory or preferential market access for U.S. industrial and agricultural products and vowed not to sign agreements with third countries that impose non-scientific technical standards, discriminatory sanitary or phytosanitary measures, or other rules incompatible with U.S. or international norms.

Malaysia will also provide a “robust standard” of intellectual property protection and extend to the U.S. any trade in services commitments it grants in deals with other partners. The country agreed to ban imports of goods made with forced or compulsory labor, uphold internationally recognized labor rights, and address labor issues contributing to non-reciprocal trade.

Environmental commitments include enforcing domestic laws, maintaining strong governance frameworks, and tackling environmental issues that distort trade. Malaysia also pledged not to apply value-added taxes or digital service taxes that discriminate against U.S. companies.

The agreement devotes significant space to digital trade. Malaysia will refrain from imposing taxes on digital services or other levies that discriminate against U.S. firms and will promote digital commerce with the U.S. by avoiding restrictive measures. It will also consult Washington before entering new digital trade agreements that could compromise essential U.S. interests.

If the U.S. imposes import restrictions—such as tariffs, quotas, or bans—on a third country for reasons related to economic or national security, Malaysia will be notified for coordination purposes. If Washington determines that Malaysia is cooperating to address shared security and economic concerns, such cooperation may be considered when applying U.S. export controls, investment reviews, and related measures.

Should Malaysia sign a free trade or preferential economic agreement with another country that undermines U.S. interests, Washington may terminate its bilateral deal with Kuala Lumpur if consultations fail to resolve its concerns.

The agreement also commits Malaysia to facilitate and promote U.S. investment in sectors such as critical minerals, energy resources, power generation, telecommunications, transportation, and infrastructure services.

In particular, the pact opens the door to cooperation on critical and rare-earth minerals. Malaysia pledged the “expedited development” of these sectors in partnership with U.S. companies, including: (1) refraining from banning or limiting exports of critical minerals or rare-earth elements to the U.S.; (2) granting extended operating permits to ensure expanded production capacity; and (3) guaranteeing unrestricted sales of rare-earth magnets to U.S. firms.

Malaysia also committed to facilitate up to $70 billion in job-creating investments in the United States over the next decade, including funding for new projects.

*By Assis Moreira — Kuala Lumpur

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/

Restrictions on Brazilian steel were imposed in 2018 during the Trump administration

06/14/2022


Restrictions on Brazilian steel were imposed in 2018 during the Trump administration — Foto: Reprodução/Severstal

Restrictions on Brazilian steel were imposed in 2018 during the Trump administration — Foto: Reprodução/Severstal

The Biden administration has signaled to Brazil that it will not meet so soon the demand to review the quotas that limit the ingress of domestic steel in the U.S. market — although it has already made agreements with the European Union and Japan.

Valor has learned that the U.S. deputy secretary of commerce, Don Gaves, advised Brazilian representatives when he was in Brasília about a month ago that there was no political climate yet in the U.S. to deal with the review of the situation of Brazilian steelmakers.

However, the number 2 at the Commerce Department “promised to make the best efforts,” according to a source.

When asked recently in an interview about lifting tariffs on steel from China, the U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said that “with respect to the tariffs, our approach, as with everything in this relationship, is to be strategic.”

The restrictions on Brazilian steel were imposed in 2018 during the Trump administration, despite President Donald Trump ideological affinity with the Bolsonaro administration. That was when Mr. Trump, amid trade tensions with China, decided that foreign steel threatened to “weaken national security” and imposed an additional 25% tariff on imports of steel products and 10% on aluminum imports, causing tremendous irritation in Washington allies who saw the measure as retaliation.

Of the $2.3 billion of steel that Brazil exports on average to the U.S. per year, 85% is semifinished products, that is, raw material for the American steel mills to make the final product.

Under President Joe Biden, the U.S. and the European Union reached in October an agreement whereby Washington kept the additional tariffs, but exempted a specific portion, allowing European companies to sell a certain “historical volume.”

Later, Washington struck a deal with Japan, another major ally, eliminating tariffs since April within an import quota of 1.25 million tonnes of Japanese steel — a volume still lower than the 1.8 million tonnes exported by Japan in 2018.

In the case of Brazil, the assessment in Brasília is that the Biden administration has no appetite to deal with trade. Last week, during the Summit of the Americas, the U.S. insisted on redesigning supply chains amid the new geopolitical situation, but showed nothing concrete, according to a source.

*By Assis Moreira — Geneva

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com/
Guedes met UBS CEO Colm Kelleher — Foto: Reprodução/Twitter/ME

Guedes met UBS CEO Colm Kelleher — Foto: Reprodução/Twitter/ME

Economy Minister Paulo Guedes said that “everyone is going after Brazil” at the World Economic Forum and that, with the turnaround in world geopolitics, the country will “dance” with the U.S. and China at the same time.

In a conversation with journalists, Mr. Guedes said that Brazil suffered pressure from both the United States and Europe in the wake of the war in Ukraine to stand on one side. But that now “nobody is cursing us” and Brazil is seen as a solution to energy and food crises.

As an example, he said that the new interest in Brazil with a series of bilateral meetings on Tuesday in Davos — with the CEOs of UBS, Mittal, Alibaba, Sem Merck, Claure Capital, YouTube, Canada Pension Plan Investment (CPP), as well as lunch with investors promoted by Itaú Unibanco.

“There is demand from 30 of the largest companies in the world, but we can’t supply everyone,” said the minister.

In the World Economic Forum, Brazil is almost absent from the agenda, without any specific debate. The public manifestations of most of the authorities present are about the size of a possible recession in the European Union, in the United Kingdom, and perhaps in the U.S. after next year. In other words, little is said about Brazil, except in restricted circles that know more about the country.

According to the minister, “people do not understand: the world has changed and Brazil’s position has improved.” He says that “Brazil has lost 30 years, it has not connected (with global value chains). China got out of poverty, Thailand, everyone went up, and Brazil was left hopping.”

The minister adds that with the crises caused by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, other countries got into difficulties, but not Brazil. And so, in his vision, the country can redesign its production chains with new axes, such as renewable energy and semiconductors.

In this scenario, said Mr. Guedes, the pressures came on Brazil. He said that the Europeans asked Brazil if the country was on their side or on Russia’s, if it was with the Brics or with the OECD.

On the one hand, the U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen made it clear that Washington would redesign investment criteria and that the world will never be the same. In other words, the U.S. needs closer supply chains and reliable partners.

The way Brazil is going to stand, according to the minister, is to be “the guy that is going to give food and energy security to Europe. And the U.S., which Brazil is close to and a friend of, will not need to go to China.”

As for China, “the Chinese and the Americans had a synergy that lasted 30 years, then China grew and they started fighting. We are going to dance with both of them.

Furthermore, Brazil wants to accelerate its integration into the OECD. He said he has established a good relationship with Mathias Cormann, Secretary-General of the OECD, who will visit Brazil in the near future.

Source: Valor International

https://valorinternational.globo.com