It appears to be Banco Master, but this is BRK Financeira, formerly Brickell, which collapsed two and a half years before Daniel Vorcaro’s institution. A review conducted by Valor now shows that, beyond the storyline, some of the individuals involved in transactions under investigation are common to both cases.

In the case of Master, BMQ Mirage took out what was allegedly a sham loan and shortly thereafter injected R$445 million into the D Mais investment fund, managed by Reag—where the funds were allegedly diverted, according to a report of suspected fraud sent by the Central Bank to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in November last year.

A review of court documents now shows that the same BMQ Mirage is being pursued by the bankruptcy administrator of BRK Financeira for having taken out a R$12 million loan. In the proceedings, its lawyers even sought a waiver of court fees, claiming the company lacked the resources to pay litigation costs. The request was denied.

Another figure common to both banking collapses is Henrique Peretto of Cartos, who was targeted in a police operation in November 2025 to investigate his alleged role in the purported fabrication of R$12.2 billion in loan portfolios sold by Banco Master to Banco de Brasília (BRB).

In the BRK case, two companies linked to Peretto—Cartos Securitizadora and Dirua—appear on the liquidator’s list of creditors as holders of subordinated debt totaling R$21.867 million. The funds these companies placed in BRK strengthened the lender’s capital base and enabled it to increase leverage by raising deposits covered by the Credit Guarantee Fund (FGC), a private nonprofit entity established to manage protection mechanisms for clients of financial institutions in the event of resolution.

When the lender collapsed, the FGC itself was called upon to cover the losses by reimbursing depositors. The official creditors’ list shows that the fund, which administers Brazil’s deposit insurance system, is owed R$1.718 billion, with little prospect of recovering those resources.

An examination of BRK’s financial statements shows that it followed a trajectory strikingly similar to Master’s. First came rapid growth in deposits raised through investment platforms, offering returns of up to 140% of the CDI benchmark rate.

It was later placed into out-of-court liquidation by the Central Bank and became the target of administrative proceedings listing signs of fraud aimed at diverting funds, including loans that violated banking standards, investments in a chain of exclusive investment funds holding overvalued assets allegedly used to launder and conceal money, and investments in court-ordered debt claims.

BRK Financeira was liquidated on February 15, 2023, before Banco Master showed its first signs of liquidity stress and suspected fraud. It took roughly two years, however, for Central Bank supervision to detect similar problems at Vorcaro’s institution.

One issue common to both cases was permission to raise funds via investment platforms with FGC coverage—creating a so-called moral hazard, in which a bank assumes greater risks knowing that potential losses will ultimately be borne by others. It took more than 10 months for the Central Bank to adopt a stronger corrective measure, as set out in Resolution 5,114 of December 21, 2023.

As with Master, BRK’s deposit growth was meteoric. In 2019, the lender reported zero in time deposits, according to its financial statements. A year later, in 2020, the total had risen to R$94 million, then climbed exponentially: R$766 million in 2021 and R$1.5 billion in 2022. The final loss to the FGC totaled R$1.718 billion.

Those deposits could grow only because BRK increased its equity, as prudential rules limit a bank’s operations to the size of its capital base. In 2020, its equity stood at negative R$4 million. By December 2022, it had reached R$67 million—an important portion of which was contributed by companies linked to Peretto.

When it placed the lender into liquidation on February 15, 2023, the Central Bank said that there was a capital imbalance, concluding that the investments recorded on the balance sheet were not worth what BRK claimed and therefore insufficient to guarantee repayment to depositors.

The Central Bank’s liquidation order also cited “serious violations of legal rules governing the institution’s operations.” In this case, the regulator was much more rapid in detecting problems in credit operations.

As BRK’s FGC-backed deposits were gaining initial momentum, Central Bank inspectors identified R$197 million in loans extended without credit analysis, collateral, or evidence that borrowers generated sufficient revenue and profit to repay the amounts due.

The supervisory report does not disclose the names of the companies involved. But the BMQ Mirage case illustrates the pattern. The company operates in wholesale food distribution, has a capital of R$900,000, and lists Juan Pedro Benalli Hammou as a partner.

A report by the newspaper O Globo revealed that he is the Spanish coach of the Indian Super League soccer team NorthEast United. He told the newspaper he was unaware of the business. Records from the São Paulo Commercial Registry state that he is represented by a proxy, accountant João Fernando Machado Miranda, who told O Globo he left the company in 2013.

A second investigation was opened by the Central Bank after the liquidator found that BRK had invested R$884 million in nine investment funds that purchased court-ordered debt claims.

The review commissioned by the liquidator concluded that five of those funds, which received the bulk of the resources, held assets deemed worthless; it therefore required a 100% provision on those amounts. In the other four funds, a 50% provision was imposed. Of the R$884 million invested, only R$79 million remained. These investments were made in December 2022, two months before the Central Bank ordered BRK’s liquidation.

BRK’s controlling shareholder, Nelson Pinheiro, who is also a partner at Ducoco, was fined by the Central Bank and barred from holding positions in the financial system due to the alleged wrongdoings. Suspected fraud was reported to prosecutors. In 2025, São Paulo’s civil police conducted an operation as part of an investigation into the transfer of funds to tax havens allegedly diverted from Brickell Financeira.

In a statement, Peretto’s lawyers, Maria Elizabeth Queijo and Eduardo Zynger, said the investment in BRK was made with the expectation that he would become a partner in the lender.

“Through Dirua, Peretto invested in BRK Financeira’s Financial Bills, as did Cartos Securitizadora, with the expectation of becoming a partner in BRK Financeira, an operation that was not approved by the Central Bank,” the statement said. “Dirua is therefore a creditor of BRK Financeira, as is Cartos Securitizadora.” The lawyers added that BMQ Mirage is an entity unknown to Peretto.

Regarding the loan at Banco Master, BMQ Mirage said through its lawyer, Carlos Kauffmann, that in June 2024, the company received an offer from the bank for a credit line, whose release would depend on project approval and the provision of several guarantees by BMQ and its representatives.

According to the statement, the operation was intended to finance a project in the meatpacking sector, which “did not proceed due to temporary unviability in the sector and, consequently, the impossibility of meeting the guarantees required for the release of funds.”

“This occurred at a time when there was no questioning of Master’s liquidity or operations, nor of Reag’s functioning,” it said. According to the lawyer, in June 2024, an operational agreement for the release of funds was signed between Banco Master and BMQ Mirage, with the intervention and consent of Bravo Fundo de Investimento Multimercado Crédito Privado. In December 2024, the agreement was terminated for the same amount.

On the same date as the termination, the statement said, Reag—the fund manager—opted to transfer the resources to another fund, with no connection to BMQ. “Throughout the period mentioned, the referenced amount remained in custody at Reag, without movement, in the BMQ Cash Investment Fund, fully managed by Reag, without the active participation of BMQ or its representatives,” the statement said. “BMQ obtained no gain from the transaction, which in fact was never completed.”

Regarding BMQ’s transactions with BRK, lawyer Pedro Raposo Jaguaribe of Pedro Jaguaribe Advogados e Associados said in a statement that the company held a collateral investment with the lender linked to a R$5 million guaranteed credit account, securing a credit limit of the same amount. “Until the date of the financial institution’s liquidation, BMQ was not listed as a debtor, and all installments had been settled on time.”